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Scholarly Viewpoints, with Nicholas Tarling.1 
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the British. He was the editor of The Cambridge 
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1. IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT WOULD BE THE CURRENT TREND 
OF YOUR DISCIPLINE; SPECIFICALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION?  
 
The nation-state paradigm for writing history—which goes back to Leopold von 
Ranke and the foundation of the modern discipline —was sometimes dismissed 
in the late 20th century when the state was supposed, amid economic and 
cultural "globalisation," to be withering away. But it is still very much alive in 
areas where the nation-state is still establishing itself as the pre-eminent 
political entity. And that includes much of the "Asia Pacific." ASEAN is built 
on the Bandung principles that endorsed sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Japan was the first "modern" state in East Asia. China has, perhaps, a more 
ambiguous attitude. New Zealand—if not Australia, too—is very much into 
navel-gazing. 
 Indeed it sometimes seems that neighbours are reluctant to write about 
neighbours. Language is often a barrier, but sensitivity perhaps even more often. 
Those who write about "regions" tend to be "outsiders" especially students of 
politics and "security." Historians are more cautious. The archives they need are 
often closed and they wonder whether a region has reality. 
 "Regions," too, are often very ill-defined. Are they more than a kind of 
political rhetoric, constructivist though it may be? Where regional organisations 
of one kind or another exist, they provide a kind of diplomacy, through which 
national interests may be advanced or defended. That is true of APEC (Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation), for example, in which Japan and Australia took 
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the initial lead. And what of India? Part of Asia, of course, but its relationship 
with the Pacific is limited, and, with the departure of Indians from Fiji, 
becoming less still. 
 The jaw-jaw is extensive. Ron Crocombe (1929–2009)2 counted 700 Asia 
Pacific organisations in 2006. The organisations comprise a complex set of 
networks through which members of the elite may get to know each other. The 
extent to which the bulk of the people is involved is more open to question. 
Would greater involvement make the organisations more difficult to sustain or 
less? 
 Perhaps an historian should look on the Asia Pacific, as on other regions, 
in a comparative way, comparing one with another, as well as comparing the 
globalised world of nation states and regions with the world of empires it has 
succeeded. 
 
 
2. IMPACT OF YOUR DISCIPLINE ON THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION; 
'WHAT', 'HOW', 'WHY', ETC?  
 
Novelties such as the emergence of nation-states and regions may stimulate 
historians. It is more difficult to assess the impact of their writings. Sometimes 
their conclusions are taken up by others, but often in a mistaken way. Certain 
assessments become lessons which subsequent historians find impossible to 
dislodge. The most obvious is the "lesson" of Munich. You should not appease 
dictators, statesmen concluded. But was Nasser, as Eden thought, really another 
Hitler? 
 If leaders often get it wrong, or find it easy to think it right, the people 
they lead often rely on legend. History is difficult to teach, though, except in 
New Zealand (likewise in many other nation-states), it is usually part of a 
national curriculum. Putting it to the young often makes it rather boring, and 
prescriptions often make it rather crude. Leaders are able to use it, mobilise it, 
often for unhappy purpose, evoking a "memory" they have in fact created. Pol 
Pot could point to Angkor, even as Angkar was committing its atrocities. 
 More positively, I think history, or at least a view of history, contributed 
to the making of ASEAN. The Malayan/Malaysian leaders who took the 
necessary initiative evoked a history of Southeast Asia marked by outside 
intervention, blaming outsiders for its "Balkanisation." Implicitly, however, 
they accepted that foreign intervention had often been the result of local dispute 
or invitation, and the purpose of the ASEAN Way that modified the sharpness 
of nation-state interest was to avoid or bury interstate differences and quarrels. 
 It seems unlikely that history, accurate or not, could be used in any 
similar way in relation to the Asia Pacific, especially in view of its geographical 
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indeterminacy. It might be stimulated by the concept, however, and if you 
believe, as I do, that history should try to be as objective as possible rather than 
abandoning the attempt, and that fuller knowledge can contribute to larger 
understanding, it may after all have a part to play. 
 
 
3. YOUR COMMENTS ON THE STATE OF RECENT (LAST 2–3 
DECADES) SCHOLARSHIP OF YOUR DISCIPLINE?  
 
History is an inveterate "borrower" from other disciplines, seen sometimes as 
more scientific or at least more fashionable. Borrowing was and is useful in 
Southeast Asian historiography, especially for periods and societies for which 
documentary evidence is unavailable, and older Rankean methods cannot be 
pursued. 
 Much of the work done after the Second World War (1939–45) in the 
early days of the nation-states and national history was stimulated by 
archaeological, anthropological and sociological studies, at some risk to the 
perception of change over time, and, rather paradoxically, at the risk of adopting 
inappropriately "Western" approaches and categories. 
 I am, however, less convinced of the advantages of the subsequent 
"linguistic turn." But clearly well-researched comparative studies of "ethnicity," 
for example, have made and will make regional sense, especially on a 
comparative basis. 
 The fields in which I have largely concentrated my efforts are 
international, diplomatic and post-imperial history. I am concerned that scholars 
investigating such topics are often unable to access government records in their 
own countries and have to rely on those in ex-imperial countries that operate a 
30-year rule. That is something of a paradox and is certainly a limitation. 
 
 
4. ON CURRENT SCHOLARS OF YOUR DISCIPLINE, VIZ. 
INDIGENOUS OF THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION OR FROM 
WITHOUT, INTERESTS, CHARACTERISTICS, ETC.?  
 
This year (2012) will mark the 60th anniversary of my first visit to what was 
then the Public Record Office in London, to start on my thesis on British policy 
in the Malay Peninsula and archipelago, 1824–71 under the supervision of an 
old Malay hand, Victor Purcell (1896–1965). Over this 60-year period the 
business of history has, of course, changed considerably. In one major way, for 
the better: the involvement of local scholars, challenging though their task is. At 
the same time I am concerned by the diminution of interest in most of the 
"region" on the part of scholars and students in other countries: I have in mind 
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the U.S., the U.K. and Australia and New Zealand, more than the Netherlands, 
Germany or Scandinavia. Whatever boundaries are drawn for the region, it 
ought to be the focus of world-wide scholarly interest, and exemplify the 
discipline's power to encompass, analyse and compare changes that occur, if not 
world-wide, in a wide range of societies. 
 I read quite a wide range of historians and on quite a wide range of 
topics, but I cannot offer a general comment. I particularly enjoy two types of 
history-writing: that which throws light on a subject by thorough and detailed 
research, preferably presented without too much jargon; and that which puts a 
topic in a new light by making novel connexions and comparisons or educing 
what Vic[tor] Lieberman3 calls "strange parallels."4 I am much less attracted by 
those—and there are some—who seem to be saying in an unnecessarily 
complicated if not designedly obfuscatory way what is already known. There is 
still plenty of music to be written in C major. 
 
 
5. THE FUTURE OF YOUR DISCIPLINE IN RELATION TO THE 
ASIA PACIFIC REGION, VIZ. TRENDS, DIRECTION, VISION?  
 
The concept of the Asia-Pacific region seems unlikely to spur on the writing of 
a history of the Asia-Pacific region: the young will feel it is foolhardy and not 
something that will earn a place in a peer-reviewed journal or other bonus 
points; and the old realise that they have no time left so far as they can tell. But 
it may be that it will stimulate the re-examination of old connexions—across the 
Pacific, for example, with the aid perhaps of galleons of treasures in the Spanish 
archives—or old perceptions such as "Austral-Asia."  
 Juxtapositions can also be stimulating. I read recently of the sharp 
practice that led to the incorporation of Hawaii as a state of the Union in 1959, 
and wondered if it threw some light on the readiness of the Americans soon 
after that to promote the incorporation of West New Guinea into Indonesia 
under the quite unsatisfactory arrangements of the Bunker plan. 
 If my observations of New Zealand are more widely applicable, I would 
need to criticise an undue focus on one part of the region. That is clearly the 
result of the "rise" of China. Southeast Asia gets left out of most general 
histories. It should not be by-passed in considering the history of the Asia-
Pacific. China's own interests, after all, are world-wide. 
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6.  SOME ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR UP-AND-COMING 
SCHOLARS FOCUSING ON THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION?  
 
"Old men forget," as Shakespeare absurdly suggested. But, in retirement even if 
still honourarily affiliated, they do get out of date. So any advice I might give to 
those up-and-coming is even more hesitant than it used to be. Universities have 
changed, even though retaining the name. They have become more like 
corporate bodies with top-down management, and the knowledge they purvey 
has been commodified. History is not doing well in this environment, though 
there is still a popular interest in the subject. You need to be keen and hard-
working and, if you succeed, you may still find a niche in the university if that 
is your objective or in another field in which your skills can be turned to 
account. But you may find that that your research will have to be its own 
reward, and it will be, if you have pursued it loyally and objectively. History is 
also, of course, a good discipline to sustain you in retirement: bowls, also 
concerned with bias, is surely more boring. And golf is for Southeast Asian 
statesmen.  
 
 
7. ANY OTHER OPINIONS, VIEWPOINTS TO EXPRESS, SHARE, 
ETC.  
 
A further current concern as far as the Asia-Pacific is concerned is that it risks 
being concerned with the "Rim" and leaves out the islands, the hole in the 
doughnut. Only Papua New Guinea is a member of APEC: it is an observer at 
ASEAN. The Pacific islands are divided into metropolitan territories and states 
more or less independent, exposed to foreign intervention, and possibly 
exposed, as the technologies become economically viable, to increased 
economic exploitation. How can they play a role in their own fate? Can it only 
be by following the lead Australia has given since the Howard government 
changed its policy? Historians have written on the individual island states, 
especially Fiji. They have also written on the islands and the islanders more 
generally. What are the possibilities of a regional approach? Interested in the 
history of ASEAN, I have been wondering whether historians can elicit any 
useful comparisons or point, as Jusuf Wanandi once did, to any useful 
connexions.  
 
 
